K-12 School Security

A GUIDE FOR PREVENTING AND PROTECTING AGAINST GUN VIOLENCE

2ND EDITION : 2018

Homeland Security

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THIS GUIDE AND THE ASSOCIATED SCHOOL SECURITY SURVEY ARE AVALIABLE AT:

https://www.dhs.gov/publication/k-12-school-security-guide

SECTION 1

Introduction

1.1 : THREAT ASSESSMENT

Educational agencies and institutions face a myriad of threats that include tornadoes, hurricanes, student bullying, drugs, and gang violence, just to name a few. School officials conduct assessments to properly prepare and mitigate these hazards on a continuous basis. This resource guide was developed to address only one of the specific threats that schools face – gun violence. The intent is to outline preventive and protective measures specifically for K-12 institutions to address the risk posed by an active shooter.

According to the Department of Education (ED), there are approximately 131,890 K-12 schools (public and private) operating in the United States (US).[1] ED reports that approximately 55.9 million students were enrolled in American schools in 2016 and enrollment rates are expected to increase over the next 10 years.[2] According to Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) data there were 37 shootings at K through 12 learning institutions, accounting for approximately 15% of the active shooter incidents in the U.S. from 2000-2017, see Figure 1.[3, 4]

[1] U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics. (2016). Digest of Education Statistics, 2015, Table 105.50.

[2] U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics (2016). Digest of Education Statistics, 2016, Table 105.30.

[3] Active Shooter Incidents in the United States from 2000-2017 Federal Bureau of Investigation https://www.fbi.gov/about/partnerships/office-of-partner-engagement/active-shooter-incidents-graphics

[4] Per the FBI, an active shooter is defined as an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a populated area.

[5] Federal Bureau of Investigation https://www.fbi.gov/about/partnerships/office-of-partner-engagement/active-shooter-incidents-graphics. Note: of the 37 incidents at schools in the report, one took place at a nursery (pre-K) school and one incident occurred during a school board meeting which was being hosted on school property but no students were involved (neither perpetrator nor victim). The remainder (35) were perpetrated by or against students, faculty, and/or staff at K-12 schools.

Quick Look: 250 Active Shooter Incidents Between 2000–2017

LOCATION CATEGORIES

Schools (K to 12)
14.8% (37)
Institutions of
Higher Education
6% (15)

Businesses, Open
to Pedestrian Traffic
26% (65)
Businesses, Closed
to Pedestrian Traffic
12% (30)
Malls
4% (10)

EDUCATION
20.8% (52)

COMMERCE
42% (105)

OPEN SPACE
14% (35)

GOVERNMENT
10% (25)

Other
Govenment
Properties
7.2% (18)
Military
2.8% (7)

OTHER
LOCATION
0.4% (1)

HEALTHCARE
FACILITIES
4% (10)

HOUSES OF
WORSHIP
**4% (10)**

RESIDENCES
4.8% (12)

FIGURE 1 –
Active Shooter
Incidents in the US:
Location Categories[5]

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2017.

1.2 : SCOPE OF THE GUIDE

The threat of gun violence in schools necessitates attention across the spectrum of emergency management mission areas: prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery. The vision and sample core capabilities of each phase are shown below along with their correlation to how schools should apply them per ED's Readiness and Emergency Management for Schools (REMS), see Figure 2. While mitigation, response, and recovery represent critical aspects of emergency management, this guide focuses on considerations for schools specifically in the areas of prevention and protection. Along with prevention and protection, schools should take into consideration the core capabilities and principles (presented in Figure 2) of mitigation, response, and recovery in their security plans. Three core capabilities underpin all five preparedness mission areas: planning, public information/warning, and operational coordination. Due to these intersections, one should expect that measures implemented in the functional areas of prevention and protection may cross over or have direct effects on mitigation, response, and/or recovery efforts.

This guide and the associated survey provide immediate and actionable options for consideration based on the results of the individual school's responses to the survey. There have been many resources in recent years which provide broad, overarching security best practices and themes. While very informative, these documents have lacked action-oriented guidance on active shooter situations for K-12 schools, school administrators, and the organizations charged with prevention and protection. Although the primary audience for this guide is the K-12 community, institutions of higher education or pre-K schools may also benefit from the information presented herein.

The options for consideration expressed in this guide are based on outreach to K-12 schools, security assessments conducted by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security

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[6] Revised language from the FEMA Mission Areas. Note: There are 32 core capabilities outlined by the National Preparedness Goal—only those relevant to active shooter scenarios are presented here.

[7] Revised language from the REMS Protection for Schools and School Districts Fact Sheet

FIGURE 2 – Preparedness Mission Areas[6, 7]

	PREVENTION	PROTECTION	MITIGATION	RESPONSE	RECOVERY
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (FEMA)	VISION: Prevent, avoid, or stop an imminent, threatened or actual catastrophic incident. CORE CAPABILITIES: information sharing, forensics, interdiction and disruption, screening/search/detection.	VISION: Protect citizens, residents, visitors, and assets against threats and hazards. CORE CAPABILITIES: protective measures, access control, risk management.	VISION: Reduce the loss of life and property by lessening the impact of future disasters. CORE CAPABILITIES: community resilience, vulnerability reduction, threat and hazard identification, risk/resilience assessment.	VISION: Respond quickly to save lives, protect property and the environment, and meet basic human needs. CORE CAPABILITIES: community resilience, vulnerability reduction, hazard identification, risk/resilience assessment.	VISION: Recover through restoration, strengthening and revitalization of infrastructure, economy, and fabric of communities. CORE CAPABILITIES: economic recovery, housing, health/social services.
READINESS AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT FOR SCHOOLS (REMS)	The action schools and school districts take to prevent a threatened or actual incident from occurring.	The ongoing actions schools and school districts take to eliminate or reduce the loss of life, injuries, and property damage from an emergency event.	Eliminating or reducing the loss of life, injuries, and property damage from an emergency event at a school.	Putting the school's and school district's plans into place to effectively respond to an emergency event, and provide for the immediate needs of students and staff.	Teaming with community partners to restore educational programming; the physical environment; business operations; and social, emotional, and behavioral health.

(DHS) at such institutions, and the review of a vast number of publicly-available studies and resources on this subject (see appendices)[8]. After consulting many such sources and taking into account its own understanding of security in K-12 schools, DHS has identified and organized a set of vulnerabilities and options for consideration specific to preventing and protecting against the threat of gun violence.

In using this guide it is important to understand that every school is unique. Each facility will have its own set of priorities, resources, and building characteristics that will determine which, if any, of these options for consideration may be applicable to mitigate risk. Each facility will also have to balance the choice to implement or upgrade security measures against possible disruption to the learning environment. Schools represent a range of local and regional environmental, historical, and cultural influences. A facility's particular characteristics merit reflection to make a safe, comfortable, and attractive educational environment. Moreover, the uniqueness of the school population could have an effect on the risk management decisions applied. For instance, one could expect the student screening procedures (e.g., bag searches, ID checks, use of metal detectors) at a high school with students ages 14 and older to look much different from the school screening procedures in a kindergarten with students ages five and up.

1.3 : ORGANIZATION OF THIS GUIDE

Given the possibility of a gun violence threat at a K-12 school, and taking into account the purpose and scope of this guide, here is an overview of its structure and how it is intended to be applied. Section 2 explains the security philosophy and principles sustaining the methodology employed. Section 3 reviews the school security survey and includes instructions for completing it. The Excel spreadsheet is a security survey to be conducted by K-12 schools to gain an understanding of the current level of protection at the facility. The survey results will create a prioritized set of options for consideration in subsequent tabs of the spreadsheet to address identified vulnerabilities. Section 4 ties together all of the work that has been done and suggests ways to turn the results into a path forward. Lastly, Section 5 concludes with an overview of the completed process and underlines further areas for consideration. The appendices provide additional security countermeasures and resources.

[8] *DHS does not endorse any person, product, service or enterprise. Mention of non-federal resources or entities in this publication are provided for illustrative purposes and do not constitute an endorsement by DHS.*

SECTION 2

A Systematic Approach to Improve Security

2.1 PREVENTION AND PROTECTION

Prevention and protection represent two components of the preparedness spectrum. This guide focuses on these areas because the activities and measures associated with them occur prior to an incident. Effective preventative and protective actions decrease the probability that schools (or other facilities) will encounter incidents of gun violence or should an incident occur, it reduces the impact of that incident.

Although this guide is focused on the threat of gun violence in schools, the level of security established by a facility will be based on the hazards relevant to the facility and the people or groups associated with it. As new or different threats become apparent, the perception of the relative security changes. The perception of insecurity relative to the threat should drive change to reflect the level of confidence of the people or groups associated with the facility. Not having a plan or process for adapting to changing threats can magnify the perception of insecurity. This section provides a basic and practical process for addressing threats applicable to any organization.

FIGURE 3 – Hometown Security Approach[9]

Homeland Security Starts with Hometown Security

Security starts **here.**

connect · plan · train · report

Reach out and develop relationships in your community, including local law enforcement. Having these relationships established before an incident occurs can help speed up the response when something happens.

Take the time now to plan on how you will handle a security event should one occur. Learn from other events to inform your plans. Or more simply, get organized to the task the team is trying to accomplish and chart a path to accomplishing that task.

Provide your employees with training resources and exercise your plans often. The best laid plans must be exercised in order to be effective. Make sure everyone involved in the plan knows their role and is very comfortable with what they need to do. This should be confirmed through drills, games and exercises.

"If You See Something, Say Something®" is more than just a slogan. Call local law enforcement if you aren't already part of a larger suspicious activity reporting organization. Train your team to know what "something" is and what to do with it.[8]

[9] https://www.dhs.gov/hometown-security

DHS has adopted a Hometown Security approach which emphasizes the process of Connect, Plan, Train, Report (CPTR) to realize effective, collaborative outcomes. The steps, outlined in Figure 3 and the subsequent sections, are very straightforward.

2.2 : CONNECT

The first phase of the process is Connect which emphasizes outreach and collaboration. The coalition-building phase of any culture change effort is vitally important and should never be considered 100% complete—there are always new partnerships to seek and relationships to forge. DHS presumes that most schools have some kind of group or organization responsible for security. If not, this is a logical first step. If the security team is informally organized or managed, then a natural next step would be to formalize the approach to promote the sustainability and resilience of the coalition.

> THERE IS VIRTUALLY NO LIMIT TO HOW MANY INDIVIDUALS PLAY A ROLE IN A FACILITY'S SECURITY POSTURE. TO VARYING DEGREES, SECURITY IS EVERY PERSON'S RESPONSIBILITY.

It is a common sentiment that security is in conflict with convenience. A strong coalition helps carry the message to the rest of the community to minimize the resistance to necessary security measures. Coalition members[10] from within the school may include district/school administrators, teachers, aides, facility operations personnel, human resources, administrative, counseling and student groups. External groups directly related to the school might include boards of education, parent organizations, mental health groups/agencies, and teacher and bus driver unions. External groups indirectly related to the school include all responder organizations to include police and fire departments, sheriff's office, emergency medical services, emergency management, and the local DHS Protective Security Advisor (PSA).[11] Other tangential groups such as volunteer organizations, utility providers, and facilities in close geographic proximity should also be considered.

Not all of these groups need to be represented at all times and at all phases. There will inevitably be core members who play a more regular role while there will also be supporting members who serve as needed. In most instances, those that control or provide the most (or most critical) resources are the core members while supporting members have a more advisory function. This makes the role of champion very important. The champion is the person who owns the majority of the responsibility for achieving a school's security goals. The champion organizes the coalition as it grows and matures. Once the initial or current coalition is formed, the next step is to develop or review the plan.

2.3 : PLAN

Making a Plan draws the coalition more closely together and solidifies the effort over time. A good resource for schools to consult in this process is the Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans (2013).[12] Schools are collaborative and collegial by nature and that quality should be maximized by applying vital planning principles like prioritization, resource management, and communication.

Even the inevitable conflicts that occur are a very valuable part of the planning process. It is also important to note that planning is perpetual and the best plans are rarely final. Plans serve as documentation of the thought and collaboration of the coalition at a particular time. Planning efforts should start by forming general consensus on goals, objectives, and priorities. Once those are established, plan refinement through detailed focus will achieve greater impact.

Specific portions of or topics within the plan should be assigned to individuals, committees, or working groups most qualified to address them. This helps to manage the workload while also maximizing the overall usefulness and accuracy of the plan. The planning process must be sustainable, otherwise

[10] There may be multiple coalitions that work together within an institution to address the threat of gun violence. Types of coalitions include: security planning team, threat assessment team, social media monitoring team, etc. The terminology used to describe these coalitions may vary across institutions. See Section 2.7 for a discussion on threat assessment teams and social media monitoring teams.

[11] To learn about the PSA Program please visit https://www.dhs.gov/protective-security-advisors. For more information or to contact your local PSA, please send an email to NICC@hq.dhs.gov.

[12] The Guide is accessible at https://rems.ed.gov/docs/rems_k-12_guide_508.pdf.

the relationships built in the Connect phase are placed in jeopardy and progress is stalled. The amount of time spent in the planning phase should be commensurate with the amount of effort expended on the other phases. Spending 90% of the time planning and only a little time coalition building, training, exercising and improving the reporting process will ultimately harm the organization it is trying to help. Time and resource management helps keep this balance.

2.4 : TRAIN

An equally important component of the CPTR process is to Train on the plan that the coalition members have developed. Training is an absolutely vital part of the larger security process. Determining who is responsible for what and how it should be done is the basic function of planning. Actually telling various members of the team what is expected of them and when to do that activity is the function of training.

The K-12 community has substantial experience developing training curricula on a vast array of topics. School administrators should maximize this skill set by finding creative ways to address a daunting topic (e.g., gun violence) in an effective but not traumatic way. The most common and frustrating mistake in developing a curriculum on gun violence is making the material overwhelming and terrifying. A more useful approach is breaking the response down into more manageable segments.

For example, DHS endorses the Run, Hide, Fight® approach in response to an active shooter.[13,14] Many organizations jump into a full scale exercise without taking the necessary iterative steps of training and smaller scale exercises first. A better approach is to break these tasks into smaller functional training and exercise sessions so people can experience parts of the intended response without fear of failure. School security exercise planning is a dynamic and challenging topic. Working at it in pieces or steps allows for a more comprehensive learning experience.

A critical flaw of many organizations trying to improve their preventive and protective measures is to provide training without validating it through exercises, which should include students. Further, many exercises have fallen short because the organization failed to develop an after-action report and improvement plan based on the exercise. There is little value in conducting an exercise if there is no intent to complete and carry out an after-action improvement plan. The whole purpose of holding an exercise is to evaluate the training tied to the plan to see if everyone knows what to do and, if not, revisit and revise the components of CPTR. That only happens when results are captured and converted into action. Further detailed guidance on exercise conduct can be found in DHS' Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP).[15]

2.5 : REPORT

All of these activities culminate in the last phase of the CPTR process, Report. The reporting phase is arguably the most important of all the phases as it applies to the scope of this guide. Reporting principles underlie the other three phases and have profound prevention and protection impacts by driving forward information. DHS models the reporting phase using the "If You See Something, Say Something®" campaign and the National Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative.[16,17] "If You See Something, Say Something®" focuses on empowering anyone who sees suspicious activity to do something about it by contacting local law enforcement, or if an emergency to call 9–1–1. This is a compelling capability when well organized and managed.

As in other areas of security, SAR plans lay the foundation for successful implementation. Some items to be addressed in the plan include when and who to call to report suspicious activity. The better trained and more familiar the reporter is with what is/is not suspicious and pertinent information to provide, the better the report and response will be. A good plan for reporting, especially for a K-12 school, involves training staff and students on what is considered suspicious. There are many methods schools can employ to facilitate this such as dedicated telephone

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[13] https://www.dhs.gov/active-shooter-preparedness

[14] Note: it may be inappropriate to teach young children, particularly elementary school students, to fight an active shooter. School officials should discuss what is most appropriate for the demographics of the school.

[15] https://www.fema.gov/hseep

[16] https://www.dhs.gov/see-something-say-something

[17] https://nsi.ncirc.gov/

numbers, websites for anonymous reporting, email or text messaging, and mobile phone applications. Conducting simple drills for reporters and receivers keeps skills sharp, reinforces the importance of the effort, and can save lives. If the plan includes sharing all suspicious activity calls with the local fusion center[18] then the probability of higher fidelity reporting increases.

2.6 ⋮ ATTENTION TO DISABILITIES AND ACCESS AND FUNCTIONAL NEEDS IN PLANNING FOR GUN VIOLENCE

When making changes to a school's plans, procedures, and protective measures, it is imperative the needs of individuals with disabilities and other access and functional needs be addressed throughout the process. Planning, training, and execution should always consider:

- *accessible alert systems for those who are deaf or hard of hearing;*
- *students, faculty, and staff who have visual impairments or are blind;*
- *individuals with limited mobility;*
- *alternative notification measures;*
- *people with temporary disabilities;*
- *visitors;*
- *people with limited English proficiency;*
- *sign cards with text and pictures based emergency messages / symbols; and*
- *involving people with disabilities in all planning.*[19, 20]

It is also important to consider the individual needs of students, faculty, and staff at a given facility rather than adopt a one-size-fits-all approach, and to provide appropriate resources and support to meet those specific needs.

2.7 ⋮ SOCIAL ASPECTS OF PREVENTING GUN VIOLENCE

DHS recognizes that physical protection measures only go so far when it comes to preventing an active shooter incident. Social issues such as mental health, bullying, and criminal profiling play a critical role in the prevention of gun violence in schools. Potential warning signs are not always the result of a direct threat—more often, there is observable conduct which sends up a red flag, so to speak. The importance of detecting and addressing concerning behavior, thoughts, or statements cannot be overstated. In fact, preventing violence by detecting and addressing these red flags is more effective than any physical security measure.

At a minimum, schools should establish and enforce policies that prohibit, limit or determine unacceptable behaviors and consequences of:

- weapons possession/use
- drug possession/use
- alcohol/tobacco possession/use
- bullying/harassment
- hazing
- cyber-bullying/harassment/stalking
- sexual assault/misconduct/harassment
- bias crimes
- social media abuse
- any criminal acts

Excerpt adapted from: Bullying, Cyber-Bullying, Teasing, Hazing, Harassing, ASIS (2014).

Teachers, students, parents, administrators, law enforcement, mental health professionals, school resource officers (SRO), and threat assessment teams (TAT) should all be educated on what to look for and how to report it. School administrators should establish and document clear policies which empower individuals to identify and report alarming conduct.

2.7.1 ⋮ MENTAL HEALTH AND SCHOOL CLIMATE

An important facet in preventing violent outbursts or behavior is to provide an early opportunity for students exhibiting potential mental health problems to receive adequate support from licensed or certified professionals. School administrators should have a consistent policy in place to refer students to individualized mental health services and support as needed. TATs should include mental health professionals (e.g., forensic psychologist, clinical psychologist, school psychologist) to contribute to the threat assessment process.[21]

In addition to integrating mental health principles into plans, officials should consider the school environment. A positive school climate teaches individuals social and emotional competencies which help them to

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[18] https://www.dhs.gov/fusion-center-locations-and-contact-information

[19] *Planning and Response to an Active Shooter: An Interagency Security Committee Policy and Best Practices Guide, Interagency Security Committee,* https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/isc-planning-response-active-shooter-guide-non-fouo-nov-2015-508.pdf.

[20] *For more information, visit the FEMA Office of Disability Integration and Coordination website:* https://www.fema.gov/office-disability-integration-and-coordination.

[21] *Threat Assessment in Schools: A Guide to Managing Threatening Situations and to Creating Safe School Climates, U.S. Secret Service and U.S. Department of Education (2004),* https://rems.ed.gov/docs/ThreatAssessmentinSchools.pdf.

understand and manage emotions and relationships, and to make good decisions. Social-emotional learning can help students stop and think before they react, control response to stress, develop supportive and caring relationships, persist through challenges, seek assistance, and take note of theirs and others' needs and feelings. Developing these competencies can help students prepare for and respond to emergencies and educates them on what constitutes potential threats and how to report them.[22, 23]

2.7.2 ⋮ THREAT ASSESSMENT TEAMS

In addition to policies and positive school climates, school districts and administrators should establish dedicated teams to evaluate threats. Most often, this comes in the form of the TAT. It is the responsibility of the TAT to investigate and analyze communications and behaviors to make a determination on whether or not an individual poses a threat to him/herself or others.[24] While a security planning coalition may establish the TAT in its plan, the assessment team is a separate entity from the planning team and does not need to be composed of the same members, although there may be some overlap in membership. The TAT must comply with applicable civil rights and civil liberties, and other federal and state laws.

As well as TATs, some schools have even opted to establish social media monitoring teams which look for key words that may indicate bullying or other concerning statements.[25] If a school opts to create such a team, it should work very closely with the TAT to ensure that applicable privacy, civil rights and civil liberties, other federal, state and local laws, and information sharing protocols are followed.

Absent a specific, actionable threat there are some general warning signs and indicators to aid school administration in identifying and mitigating threats.[26] The totality of behavioral indicators and other relevant circumstances should be evaluated when considering any response or action.

Potential warning signs may include:

- Increasingly erratic, unsafe, or aggressive behaviors
- Hostile feelings of injustice or perceived wrongdoing
- Drug and alcohol abuse
- Marginalization or distancing from friends and colleagues
- Changes in performance at work or school
- Sudden and dramatic changes in home life or in personality
- Pending civil or criminal litigation
- Observable grievances with threats and plans of retribution

Excerpt adapted from: Pathway to Violence Fact Sheet, DHS (2017).

Note: behaviors associated with these indicators can include constitutionally protected activities.

2.8 ⋮ HOMETOWN SECURITY APPROACH AND THE SCHOOL SECURITY SURVEY

The tenets of CPTR embody the philosophy behind efforts to improve school security, as discussed in this guide. Understanding the background and mindset involved in security in general and specifically as it applies to securing K-12 schools from gun violence is also important. Initial establishment of the basic security concepts and philosophy supports the improvement effort. The survey discussed in the next chapter provides refinement and focus for that effort.

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[22] *Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans (2013) https://rems.ed.gov/docs/rems_k-12_guide_508.pdf.*

[23] *For more information about teaching social and emotional competencies, visit http://safesupportivelearning.ed.gov. For additional information on how social and emotional learning may be integrated into a multi-tiered framework, visit http://www.pbis.org.*

[24] *Active Shooter, ASIS School Safety and Security Council (2013). https://admin.asisonline.org/Standards-Guidelines/Standards/under-development/ASI%20Docs/12_SSSC_Active_Shooter_SG.pdf.*

[25] *Bullying, Cyber-Bullying, Teasing, Hazing, Harassing, ASIS (2014), https://www.asisonline.org/globalassets/news/security-topics/school-security/bullying-cyber-bullying-teasing-hazing-harassing.pdf.*

[26] *See call out box for potential warning signs. A useful depiction of some of the warning signs is the DHS Pathway to Violence video available at: https://www.dhs.gov/pathway-violence-video. Further pre-attack indicators can be found in Active Shooter, ASIS School Safety and Security Council (2013).*

SECTION 3

School Security Survey for Gun Violence

clearly communicates the level of importance of each security measure relative to the others.

3.1 : INTRODUCTION

Educators are well aware of the value and purpose of an assessment to evaluate students' strengths or mastery of a particular subject. Similarly, this school security survey assesses a school's security posture. By answering the questions, the user can quickly and effectively determine a facility's security proficiency. It identifies a school's capabilities to prevent and protect against gun violence in the areas of security/emergency management, security force, entry control, fencing and gates, building envelope, and closed-circuit video/video surveillance systems. The results of the survey highlight areas of potential concern and describe how specific enhancements to security and resilience measures will potentially improve the security and resilience of their facility. The timeline, prioritization, and implementation of security measures are driven by leadership support and resource availability.

There is no shortage of literature and assessments with regard to school security and gun violence. However, existing assessment methods tend to be binary (yes/no) inventory of best security practices. *While this can be helpful to experienced security experts looking for material gaps in a physical security posture, it does not assist the non-security professional, like a school administrator or faculty member, tasked with quickly developing a comprehensive implementation plan for their school. This survey is designed to accomplish this task and to provide actionable recommendations based on the findings of the survey.* An additional benefit is that it also is arranged in a prioritized fashion, meaning that the most effective protective/preventive measures are listed towards the top of each survey section. This

3.2 : PRE-SURVEY RECOMMENDATIONS

While this survey can be completed by one person without much difficulty, it would be more beneficial to have a small group complete it as the survey is designed to drive discussion, particularly among those who already constitute a security team or will play a role in the school's security efforts. The team should include those who are familiar with administration, policies, plans, facilities, and operations.

It is also recommended that users read through this guide completely before attempting to complete the survey. Seeing the complete process from beginning to end first will make answering the questions easier and allow for better results. A thorough review of the Glossary section of the survey will help drive well-informed responses to the questions. DHS has very specific definitions for some common terms and using the proper interpretation of the terms will result in a more accurate survey.

> ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT THINGS TO KEEP IN MIND IS THAT HONEST ANSWERS WILL RESULT IN ACCURATE AND ACTIONABLE OPTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION.

While it may be tempting to take a "benefit of the doubt" approach to answering questions, this could result in a literal "false sense of security" and cause the person or people completing the survey to overlook a vulnerability or gap in security.

Lastly, a working knowledge of Microsoft Excel will facilitate the process of taking the survey. If you are not familiar with Excel, it may be worthwhile to complete some free, online tutorials.[27]

3.3 ⋮ INSTRUCTIONS

1. Download the Excel file from https://www.dhs.gov/publication/k-12-school-security-guide and immediately name and save it. This will help maintain version control and limits the possibility of losing work.

2. Enable macros in Excel before you begin the survey.

3. Locate the tabs along the bottom of the page labeled "Security Management," "Security Force," "Fencing and Gates," etc. The survey is designed to be completed tab by tab going from left to right.

4. Click on the tab labeled "Security Management" and make sure you are at the top of the sheet by checking the bar on the right of the window. There should be color-coded columns titled "Question" on the left and "Security Management Score" on the right. If these cannot be seen all at once, you might want to zoom out until they can. This is not mandatory but it makes seeing the range of questions easier.

5. Starting at the top left corner begin answering the questions by clicking the check box below the description that most accurately represents the condition at the school. While there may be some questions where the condition is not completely represented, it is best if the most complete answer is checked. Note: this may mean checking a "lower" block—this is recommended as it will result in a more accurate overall survey.

6. Once all of the questions in a tab are completed, move on to the next tab to the right of the one completed until all of the fillable tabs have been completed.

7. The tab titled "Summary" will show a bar graph that will be the numeric results of the survey. The straightforward nature of the survey results show the area of the security posture needing the most attention will be the lowest bar. If there are bars that are tied for lowest, the bar on the top is considered to be more impactful than the one on the bottom.

8. Below the bar graph will be a list of options for consideration (OFC) sorted into each functional area. The OFC at the top of the list in each area is considered to be the most impactful in that area and the areas themselves are sorted from most to least impactful. While not required, a practical approach would be to address all of the OFCs from top to bottom in the lowest scoring areas first.

9. The Action Items tab is a helpful tool for creating an implementation plan. The fillable boxes allow for each activity to be assigned to an action officer for completion for the simpler activities or a lead for more complex ones. There is also a column titled "Status" that allows for tracking of progress on each activity.

10. Remember to frequently save work and name new files as progress changes so the latest version is always plain to see.

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[27] Tutorials available online from Microsoft at: https://support.office.com/en-us/article/excel-video-training-9bc05390-e94c-46af-a5b3-d7c22f6990bb.

SECTION 4

Integrating Options for Consideration into a Plan of Action

The survey and resulting option(s) for consideration (OFC) are designed to support the development of a manageable and deliberate protective measure implementation plan.

4.1 : WHAT IS AN OFC?

This security survey identifies facilities' vulnerabilities in the areas of physical security, security forces, security management, information sharing, protective measures, and dependencies related to prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery. The results of the survey highlight areas of potential concern and provide the ability to preview how specific enhancements will potentially improve the security and resilience of the facility. An OFC is a recommendation associated with the survey question it supports.

The OFCs are designed to increase a school's ability to prevent and protect against gun violence by reducing infrastructure vulnerability. There are multiple OFCs for each question arranged from very low to very high proficiency. This allows virtually any school at any level of proficiency to take the survey in order to assess the current level of protection. The OFCs then demonstrate the next practical step(s) for the school to consider to strengthen that particular security area.

The question set and resultant security suggestions represent the culmination of the conduct of thousands of security surveys and assessments by DHS on a wide variety of facilities across the country. The OFCs are also founded on literature review, widely accepted security practices, and lessons learned. While each facility has different security needs and limitations, there are many high impact tendencies and practices that underlie a plethora of facility security programs.

4.2 : MAPPING OFCS TO SECURITY ENHANCEMENT PLANS

The purpose of this process is to assist schools of varying security proficiency. Schools that have not had to consider security improvements but now find themselves having to map a path forward can use the survey and resulting OFCs to serve as that initial map. Schools that have been actively engaged for some time in improving their security posture can use the survey to validate their efforts and in some cases discover gaps that can be filled. In both cases, the schools can cite DHS as an independent, outside source to help minimize political and administrative pressure at the local level.

> **A VITAL CONCEPT OF THIS ENTIRE EFFORT IS TO REALIZE THAT THIS PROCESS IS CONTINUOUS. THE THREAT OF GUN VIOLENCE WILL CONTINUE TO EVOLVE. IT IS IMPORTANT FOR SCHOOLS TO CONTINUOUSLY LOOK FOR WAYS TO IMPROVE THEIR SECURITY.**

Each individual OFC is tied to a specific question and is designed to provide a very good next step should the change agent(s) decide that is a step they want to take. For example, if a school does not have someone designated as a security manager (or similar title with the same duties), the next best step is to designate someone to that role. If someone

is in that role part-time then the next best step is to make that a full-time position. Understanding this progression makes interpreting the OFCs much easier and makes the prioritization process more straightforward.

Security plans will incrementally gain greater refinement over time. Once the initial round of OFCs has been addressed, it is an excellent idea to reassess annually as validation of the work being done as well as creating a new list of OFC to continuously seek improvement.

SECTION 5

Conclusion

5.1 SCHOOL SECURITY IS EVOLVING

Gun violence in schools dates back to the 1700s and its characteristics continue to evolve, thus it is critical that school administrators, government officials, first responders, and others continue to refine and improve their efforts to mitigate this threat. Through a collective effort like Hometown Security and CPTR, communities can strengthen the protective and preventive measures in place at K-12 institutions. This guide and the associated survey support these and other K-12 initiatives by integrating comprehensive security practices with applied programmatic improvements as they relate to preventing and protecting from gun violence.

This threat is persistent and so, too, must our efforts be to maintain the safety and security of school students, faculty, staff, and visitors. By their very nature schools have been exploited as soft targets. The task of hardening the K-12 community is no small undertaking, but the benefits of doing so are immeasurable. Schools, school districts, federal, state, and local agencies must take preventive and protective measures to enhance K-12 security and save lives.

5.2 ALL FACILITIES ARE DIFFERENT

Every school is different and therefore the protective measures in place will vary based on the characteristics of the site, district, and location as well as time, resources, and personnel available to the task over time. What works in a rural school may not be feasible in the inner city; historic buildings may need to be retrofitted, whereas new construction may take into account countermeasures for gun violence; some districts may have more resources available than others; the list goes on and on.

CHALLENGES AND PARTICULAR-ITIES SHOULDN'T DISSUADE SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS FROM IMPLEMENTING PREVENTIVE OR PROTECTIVE MEASURES BUT THEY MUST BE GIVEN DUE CONSIDERATION. THE UNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS OF EACH LOCATION CAN AND SHOULD INFLUENCE DECISION-MAKERS' PRIORITIES IN THE IMPLEMENTA-TION OF PROCEDURES OR INVESTMENT IN PHYSICAL SECURITY COUNTERMEASURES.

5.3 CONNECT WITH A PROTECTIVE SECURITY ADVISOR (PSA)

If you have questions about this guide or about how to use it at your school, please reach out to your local DHS PSA. They would be happy to assist you with understanding the vast array of risk management options available to you. If you do not know who your local PSA is, please contact the National Infrastructure Coordinating Center at nicc@hq.dhs.gov.

APPENDIX A

Evolving Products and Technologies for Consideration

The preventive and protective measures provided in the previous sections of this guide and the accompanying survey are the culmination of accepted industry standards, best practices, security studies, and the findings of vetted sources. That said, the list of options for consideration and protective measures is not exhaustive—there are numerous alternatives available in today's security and technology marketplaces. School administrators and decision-makers are seeking out new, innovative methods to prevent and protect against incidents of gun violence.

The intent of this appendix is to outline some of these innovations while also advising schools of the potential limits of each. Some of these services and products are still very new to the school security marketplace, consequently there has been little research or testing to substantiate their effectiveness in schools. Within that context, a number of schools and districts have taken the initiative to seek out and implement these (and other) new/upgraded technologies with the goal of improving their security posture. This is not an exhaustive list and services/products will continue to change and advance over time. Many of these are not new, per se, but have been recently redesigned and adapted to the school environment. Staying current with new products is one facet of the overall effort. To review additional research and literature on school safety and security technologies, please consult the resources listed in Appendix C.

Each facility's needs are unique and should be examined carefully when executing security decisions. Moreover, school administrators should always consult with local first responders, emergency managers and other experts like Protective Security Advisors when considering implementing any new security practices or technologies. Further, all protective measures employed should comply with applicable privacy, civil rights and civil liberties, building/fire codes, and federal, state, and local laws.

> **NEW AND INVENTIVE SECURITY PRACTICES AND TECHNOLOGIES ARE RELEASED EVERY DAY. DHS ENCOURAGES THE K-12 COMMUNITY TO BE FORWARD-THINKING WHEN IT COMES TO ALL ASPECTS OF THEIR BUSINESS PRACTICES, PARTICULARLY SECURITY.**

Many new products are heavily reliant on information technology systems and pose new layers of complexity to a school's security planning. These and other considerations, such as cost and identifying the balance between security and an open learning environment, should be weighed against the benefits of each.

Technological innovations are not a substitute for having a security plan. As noted by Rand and the National Institute of Justice, it is prudent to mention here:

> There is no quick fix for school violence. No one intervention—technological or otherwise—can fully guarantee the security of schools or resolve the underlying causes of school violence. Instead, a holistic approach to developing a school safety plan seeks to understand and address to the degree possible what leads to school violence to promote "situational awareness" among students, staff, and community members. The selection of a technology should be in service of a larger school safety approach as outlined in the plan.[28]

Inclusion in this list does not constitute endorsement on the part of DHS. These products and services serve as illustrations to supplement discussion of the current security marketplace.

[28] *The Role of Technology in Improving K-12 School Safety, Rand Corporation funded by the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice (2016), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1400/RR1488/RAND_RR1488.pdf.*

PRODUCT/SERVICE

Closed-Circuit Video (CCV)

DISCUSSION

CCV can be used to monitor an evolving situation and track a suspected shooter. In the event of a shooting or other crime, CCV can also be used as a forensic/evidence collection tool. Recent dramatic improvements in technology have reduced the cost of a CCV system while expanding its capability. Schools must follow applicable privacy, civil rights and civil liberties, federal, state and local laws when installing CCV.

COST: Installation and maintenance of CCV systems is no small expense. Depending on the size of the school and number of cameras and monitoring areas, CCV can be very costly.

MAINTENANCE: As with all physical security measures, there will be maintenance and service required to ensure operability. Monitoring systems/areas will also require upgrades and maintenance over time.

MONITORING AND RECORDING: It is recommended that all CCV systems record the data captured by the cameras in place. CCV can be monitored in real time by school administrators, security guards, or even local law enforcement (with the proper linkages and interoperability between systems). Monitoring increases the effectiveness of CCV as a protective measure. If CCV is not monitored, then the recordings serve a strictly forensic/investigative purpose. Unmonitored, unrecorded CCV systems provide little value other than the potential to deter criminal activity through the presence of cameras alone.

FIRST RESPONDERS: School officials should collaborate with local first responding and/or emergency management agencies on the use of CCV. School officials should familiarize responders with the system and ensure they are aware of where the monitoring location(s) is/are. Schools may also consider issuing keys/access cards to responders or including keys/access cards in the crisis response kit to expedite and facilitate responder access to the monitoring location(s) in the event of an emergency.

Courtesy of: Pexels

PRODUCT/SERVICE
Door Blockers

DISCUSSION

Door blockers are a relatively simple way to easily barricade a shooter from entering a doorway to classrooms, offices, auditoriums, hallways, etc. This may be a viable alternative for schools lacking doors that can be physically locked. There are many types/models to choose from, accounting for the type of doors in place, who will be using them, cost, installation, etc.

COST: The purchase price of door blockers can vary but they are a relatively low cost item. Some door blockers must be physically installed which may increase the cost.

MAINTENANCE: Door blockers should be regularly inspected and tested at least once annually to ensure operability.

TRAINING AND ACCESSIBILITY: Most door blockers are simple and straightforward to use. Schools should consider providing a demonstration to faculty, staff, and/or students to promote usability and effective deployment in the event of an active shooter. Door blockers should be stored in accessible locations.

FIRST RESPONDERS: Door blockers will prevent anyone from accessing the room/area, not only the perpetrator. First responders may be able to defeat the door blocker but it will delay entry, scene clearing, provision of medical aid, etc. Schools should also discuss fire code compliance with first responder agencies.

PRODUCT/SERVICE
Gunshot Detection Systems

DISCUSSION

Originally developed for military purposes, companies have released auditory and electro-optical gunshot detection systems which integrate maps/architectural plans of the facility. These systems utilize microphones/sensors which are capable of detecting the exact location of the gunfire and providing that information directly to emergency responders. Certain types of gunshot detection systems can even track the direction of shooting during an evolving situation and identify the type of weapon being fired.

COST: Gunshot detection systems can be expensive compared to other protective measures.

MAINTENANCE: As with all security measures, there will be maintenance and service required to ensure operability. Updates to the system will be necessary as the architectural layout of the school changes.

SUPPORTING TECHNOLOGIES: There may be other supporting technologies (CCV, motion sensors, communications, etc.) required to maximize the usefulness of these systems.

FIRST RESPONDERS: Schools will need to collaborate with first responders when installing gunshot detection technologies to ensure the notification system works as intended.

PRODUCT/SERVICE

Integrated Application-Based Services

DISCUSSION

Also new to the security market are integrated application-based services that schools and local first responders/emergency managers can use. Some apps act as panic buttons which any teacher can press to send an alert to the phone of police officers within a certain radius of the school. Other apps focus on locking down a school by virtually securing doors. Some others integrate many protective measures such as locking doors, deploying smoke cannons, activating strobe lights, and monitoring CCV.

COST: Application packages vary in cost based on the types of services required, number of users/licenses, etc. Schools should expect to pay a significant amount of money for fully integrated app services.

MAINTENANCE: System and hardware will need to be updated and maintained in accordance with the vendor's specifications/recommendations. This may result in additional costs over time.

TRAINING: Users with access to the applications should be trained in how to use them and employ them during exercises/drills.

SUPPORTING TECHNOLOGIES: There may be other supporting technologies (CCV, motion sensors, public address systems, etc.) that need to be integrated and maintained.

FIRST RESPONDERS: Schools should collaborate with first responders when employing advanced application-based technologies to ensure interoperability and accessibility.

PRODUCT/SERVICE

Locks

DISCUSSION

In accordance with recommendations from the Sandy Hook Advisory Commission and The National Association of State Fire Marshals, all classroom and office doors should be equipped with locks that can be secured from inside the room. There are a multitude of lock systems available for schools to use ranging from traditional lock-and-key to keyless and electronic systems. Some locks can be engaged with panic buttons or remotes, removing the need for someone to go near the door potentially placing the individual in harm's way. Newer locking systems can also be installed with an indicator to visually confirm that the door has been secured. When installing or upgrading locksets, schools must follow applicable building codes and statutes.

COST: Installation and maintenance of locksets will vary based on the size of the facility and type of system installed.

MAINTENANCE: As with all physical security measures, there will be maintenance and service required to ensure operability.

TRAINING AND ACCESSIBILITY: Whether the school opts to utilize electronic or physical locking mechanisms, all faculty and staff (including substitute teachers) should be given the appropriate keys, remotes, codes, etc. to secure doors. Further, occupants should be trained through drills and exercises in how to secure a room using the installed locking mechanism.

SUPPORTING TECHNOLOGIES: When installing any lock system, schools must consider the location, type, and size of windows on the door to ensure the lockset cannot be defeated by breaking the glass.

FIRST RESPONDERS: Schools should coordinate accessibility with response agencies.

PRODUCT/SERVICE
Mass Notification Systems

DISCUSSION

Today's mass notification systems go far beyond the traditional public address system. The goal of these systems is to broadcast information rapidly to facilitate appropriate response and action to students, faculty, staff, visitors, first responders, families, and the public. New technologies have created the ability to reach people using multiple methods such as public announcement, email, text message, desktop notification, etc.

COST: The costs associated with mass notification systems vary based on the services required but usually fall in the middle to high range on the cost spectrum of physical security counter-measures. Generally, schools should expect initial installation/setup fees, as well as annual fees to continue the service.

SUPPORTING TECHNOLOGIES: Depending on the type of system a school selects, there will be various supporting technologies that need to be considered such as: distress buttons, public address system, network connectivity, activation points, etc.

TRAINING AND ACCESSIBILITY: School administrators should make a plan for who has access to the mass notification system and provide adequate training to those individuals who would be responsible for executing them during an active shooter situation. Regardless of the type of system used, messages should be pre-recorded/written to reduce the time it will take to release them during an actual emergency. Messages should be succinct, direct, and use plain language (not codes) to ensure maximum comprehension. Everyone in the facility should be educated on how they will receive information through the mass notification system and what to do once it is received.

FIRST RESPONDERS: Schools should coordinate with responding agencies to ensure consistent messaging. Exercises and drills conducted in conjunction with first responders will help to refine the use of mass notification systems in the event of an actual incident.

PRODUCT/SERVICE
Motion Detectors

DISCUSSION

As a less expensive alternative to CCV, motion detectors can be used to track a suspected shooter's movements or monitor other activity in the facility. Motion detectors, unlike CCV, provide no visual of the area and therefore does not indicate who has actually set off the detector—it could be a shooter or a student fleeing the situation.

COST: Installation and maintenance of motion detectors will vary based on the size of the facility and type of system.

MAINTENANCE: As with all physical security measures, there will be maintenance and service required to ensure operability.

Courtesy of: Wikimedia

PRODUCT/SERVICE
Smoke Cannons

DISCUSSION

The primary use of smoke cannons is to disorient a shooter or assailant to prevent him/her from progressing through the building, delaying him/her long enough for law enforcement to arrive and allow students to run or hide from the threat. These products can be installed in ceilings and walls of a building and deployed remotely in the event of an incident.

COST: Installation and maintenance of smoke cannons and the technologies that support responsible deployment is costly.

MAINTENANCE: As with all physical security measures, there will be maintenance and service required to ensure operability.

SUPPORTING TECHNOLOGIES: Video surveillance or CCV should be used in conjunction with smoke cannons. Having a real-time visual of the assailant is necessary to verify his/her location in order to deploy the smoke cannons in close proximity to him/her so as to disorient the shooter but not those in other areas of the building.

TRAINING AND ACCESSIBILITY: If smoke cannons are installed in the facility, the school administrators should make a plan for who has access to the deployment technologies and provide adequate training to those individuals who would be responsible for deploying them during an active shooter situation.

FIRST RESPONDERS: Smoke can disorient a shooter but it can also disorient law enforcement and emergency personnel responding to the facility.

PRODUCT/SERVICE
Tactical Training and Equipment for SROs

DISCUSSION

The volatile and dynamic nature of active shooter attacks requires advanced training and regular practice for responders to attain and maintain proficiency for a predictable response. Advanced tactical training and equipment for school resource officers will pay dramatic dividends if an attack occurs. This extends beyond firearms training. Sophisticated medical capabilities such as advanced trauma treatment,[29] familiarity with flashbang devices, use of ballistic shields, etc. are examples of high return-on-investment training and equipment.

COST: These capabilities can be expensive but may also be eligible to be funded through grants or may be donated by the private sector in some instances.

MAINTENANCE: Equipment and skills are highly perishable but can facilitate an effective response.

TRAINING: It is very common that these highly trained and capable SROs will share portions of their capabilities with school staff and students as appropriate to create a depth of knowledge and to a certain degree establish a minor deterrent for those considering an attack against a highly trained and equipped opponent.

Courtesy of: Wikimedia

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[29] *Stop the Bleed.* https://www.dhs.gov/stopthebleed.

PRODUCT/SERVICE

Strobe Lights

DISCUSSION

Similar to smoke cannons, strobe lights can be installed in a facility with the intent of disorienting an active shooter, delaying him/her long enough for law enforcement to arrive and allow students to run or hide from the threat.

COST: Installation and maintenance of strobe lights is not in and of itself very expensive, but the technologies that support responsible use are.

MAINTENANCE: As with all physical security measures, there will be maintenance and service required to ensure operability.

SUPPORTING TECHNOLOGIES: Video surveillance or CCV should be used in conjunction with strobe lights. Having a real-time visual of the assailant is necessary to verify his/her location in order to activate the lights closest in proximity to him/her so as to disorient the shooter but not individuals in other areas of the building.

TRAINING AND ACCESSIBILITY: If strobe lights are installed in the facility, the school administrators should make a plan for who has access to the deployment technologies and provide adequate training to those individuals who would be responsible for deploying them during an active shooter situation.

FIRST RESPONDERS: Strobe lights can disorient a shooter but it can also disorient law enforcement and emergency personnel responding to the facility.

PRODUCT/SERVICE

Turnstiles

DISCUSSION

Turnstiles have been around for years but there are innovative ways of using them. Turnstiles require authenticated credentials to allow access to a facility. They can be integrated with access control systems and monitoring software. Some models are even equipped with biometric technologies (facial or fingerprint recognition). Schools could employ turnstiles to grant (or deny) access and track who is in the building at any given time in order to conduct accountability sweeps in the event of an incident (active shooter, fire, etc.).

COST: Purchase and installation costs will vary greatly depending on the type of turnstile and the number of locations they will be installed within the facility.

MAINTENANCE: As with all physical security measures, there will be maintenance and service required to ensure operability.

SUPPORTING TECHNOLOGIES: In order to maximize the benefits of installing turnstile systems, schools should obtain credentialing and access control software. Acquisition of these services will incur additional costs.

Courtesy of: Wikimedia

PRODUCT/SERVICE
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)

DISCUSSION

UAS, otherwise known as drones, have been used in military operations for decades and have recently made their way into commercial markets. There is a broad range of applications from aerial sweeps to conduct security inspections to deployment for incident response and recovery. UAS imagery can be integrated with traditional surveillance techniques (e.g., CCV) to augment existing capabilities. Further, UAS can be equipped with infrared (thermal) imaging, light detection and ranging systems (LIDAR), and other sensory technologies to monitor and evaluate security/incident response.

COST: The aircraft device, communication link, and operator and associated controller or programmable software are all components to consider when employing a drone team or seeking out a service to meet mission requirements. Depending on the requirement, this technology can range in purchase price greatly depending on the model, features desired, battery life, data storage and user interface software..

MAINTENANCE: As a security measure, there will be maintenance and service required to ensure operability in both the hardware and associated software. Determining spares and regular repair schedules are an important component to this rapidly changing technology.

SUPPORTING TECHNOLOGIES: Video surveillance or CCV could be paired with UAS sensors as well as robotic attachments and other mechanical payload customization to meet specific needs. Cybersecurity and secure data storage procedures must be considered. Launch and recovery platforms should be considered for safe and secure operation.

TRAINING: Basic and advanced certifications granted by the Federal Aviation Administration may be required based on commercial or private use of this technology and integration into the National Airspace.

REGULATIONS: UAS must be operated in accordance with Federal, state and local regulations including registration if applicable.[30]

Courtesy of: *Pexels.com*

[30] *DHS published Best Practices for Protecting Privacy, Civil Rights & Civil Liberties in Unmanned Aircraft Systems Programs which can be used as a resource for schools interested in developing this capability. The document is available at: https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/UAS%20Best%20Practices.pdf.*

PRODUCT/SERVICE

Visitor Management Systems

DISCUSSION

A visitor management system is capable of screening visitors using a government- or school-issued ID. The system will then search against databases designated by the school (e.g., sex offender lists, banned visitors) for any concerns in the visitor's background. If the visitor passes the system's screening, it will print a badge for him/her to wear while at the school. This system can track and maintain a database of visitors over time.

COST: The costs associated with visitor management systems vary based on the services required but usually fall in the middle to high range on the cost spectrum physical security countermeasures. Generally, schools should expect initial installation/setup fees, as well as annual fees to continue the service.

MAINTENANCE: System and hardware will need to be updated and maintained in accordance with the vendor's specifications/recommendations. Databases will need to be maintained and accessible for the visitor management system to be effective.

TRAINING: Employees will need to be trained in how to use the system, as well as the school's visitor access policies/procedures.

Federal Resources on Active Shooters and School Security

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security does not endorse any person, product, service or enterprise. References to specific agencies, companies, products, or services therefore should not be considered an endorsement by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Rather, the references are illustrations to supplement discussion of the issues. The Internet references cited in this publication were valid as of the date of this publication.

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APPENDIX C

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
Training Courses

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APPENDIX E

Acronyms

ASIS	American Society for Industrial Security		ID	Identification
ALICE	Alert, Lockdown, Inform, Counter, Evacuate		K-12	Kindergarten through Twelfth Grade School(s)
CCV	Closed Circuit Video		PSA	Protective Security Advisor
CPTED	Crime Prevention through Environmental Design		OFC	Option(s) for Consideration
CPTR	Connect, Plan, Train, Report		REMS	Readiness and Emergency Management for Schools
DHS	U.S. Department of Homeland Security		SAR	Suspicious Activity Reporting
ED	Department of Education		SRO	School Resource Officer
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation		TAT	Threat Assessment Team
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency		UAS	Unmanned Aircraft Systems
HSEEP	Exercise and Evaluation Program		US	United States